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A B S T R A C T
Sustainable development and climate change mitigation have become guiding policy principles in many welfare
states. However, the traditional role of a welfare state is to guarantee the economic stability, jobs and welfare for
its citizens. Sustainable development leans on the idea that we can have economic, social and environmental
sustainability at the same time. This would require decoupling of economic growth from environmental de-
gradation. Decoupling should be studied globally, because within nations, the economy can grow while local
environmental impacts decrease, but at the same time, global environmental impacts may increase due to in-
ternational trade. In this study, we examine the consumption-based carbon and material footprints of a Nordic
welfare state, Finland. We focus on the environmental impacts of public spending, which has received little
attention previously. In welfare states, the reallocation of public funds to services and individuals are at its core.
In the study, we examine how this affects the carbon and material footprints of various income groups and
household types. We find that the share of public services and investments is 19% of the carbon footprint and
38% of the material footprint per capita. Building of infrastructure plays a major role in composing the material
footprint. We also find that the welfare state has important features that improve the carbon equity between the
citizens. To achieve absolute decoupling, required to reduce environmental impacts caused by economic ac-
tivities, we suggest policies promoting public and private green investments. In addition, increased carbon
pricing would enhance green investments and drive environmental innovation.
1. Introduction
Sustainable development and climate change mitigation have be-
come guiding policy principles in many welfare states. Welfare states
are developing towards eco-states whose goal is to ensure that ecolo-
gical boundaries are not crossed (Meadowcroft, 2005; While et al.,
2010; Gough and Meadowcroft, 2011). However, environmental po-
licies have to be reconciled with many other challenges that welfare
states are facing today, such as increasing public debt, unemployment,
social and economic polarisation and ageing population (Hellström and
Kosonen, 2015). Conventional welfare states see economic growth as a
prerequisite to tackle social and economic problems. Sustainable de-
velopment, as coined by the famous Brundtland report (Brundtland
et al., 1987), has been relatively easy for welfare states to adapt, since it
does not question the objective of economic growth. However, econo-
mists, let alone ecologists, widely disagree on whether economic
growth is actually needed to tackle environmental problems (Solow,
1973; Goldin and Winters, 1995; Ekins, 2002) or whether en-
vironmentally sustainable growth is an oxymoron (Meadows et al.,
1972; Daly, 1990; Kallis, 2011). This has also led to arguments that
there may be a contradiction between a conventional welfare state and
an eco-state, since the finance of the public sector and high employment
rate may be dependent upon environmentally unsustainable economic
growth (see discussions by Meadowcroft (2005), and Bailey (2015)).
Sustainable development leans on the idea that we can have eco-
nomic, social and environmental sustainability at the same time. It has
been criticised for being more of an ideology than based on scientific
knowledge (While et al., 2010). To materialise, sustainable develop-
ment requires decoupling of economic growth from environmental
burdens. Furthermore, we need to make a distinction between relative
and absolute decoupling. Relative decoupling occurs when efficiency
increases so that environmental impacts per unit of economic output
decrease. To achieve absolute decoupling, the decrease of environ-
mental impacts need to exceed the increase of output. There has been
some scepticism about whether absolute decoupling is possible for
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, for example (Jackson, 2011). None-
theless, in 2014, global energy-related CO2 emissions halted, although
the global economy increased, which was perhaps the first evidence of
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absolute decoupling globally (Weiss, 2015; IEA, 2016). Moreover, ad-
vocates of green growth, meaning economic growth with decreasing
environmental pressure, remind us that what we have done so far is
only a fraction of what we could do to achieve green growth (Ekins,
2002). Green growth has been adopted to mainstream policy in the
OECD and the EU.
One of the challenges of verifying absolute decoupling within na-
tions is carbon leakage, or in more general terms, the relocation of any
polluting action to other countries. Often decoupling is studied by
comparing the GDP to the emissions caused within a country to de-
monstrate that the emissions are declining while the economy is
growing. However, it is possible that, at the same time, the increased
income is used to buy products from countries that have increasing
environmental burdens in absolute terms (Peters and Hertwich, 2008;
Giljum et al., 2015; Clement et al., 2017). As a solution to this ac-
counting problem, consumption-based environmental assessments have
gained popularity. Recently, Clarke et al. (2017) revealed, with Iceland
as their case study, that even practically 100% decarbonised stationary
energy production does not guarantee a low consumption-based carbon
footprint for affluent countries with high import levels. Giljum et al.
(2015) showed similar leakage effects for material consumption: even
though domestic material consumption has decoupled from economic
growth in some developed countries, the total raw material consump-
tion (including materials embodied in imports) may increase at the
same time.
Consumption-based carbon footprinting has been established as a
complementary accounting method along with the more traditional
territorial GHG accounting (Lenzen et al., 2007; Hertwich and Peters,
2009; Wiedmann, 2009; Minx et al., 2009; Ramaswami et al., 2011).
The consumption-based method can be applied to assess other en-
vironmental impacts as well, such as energy and material requirements.
While territorial accounting allocates the emissions to the geographical
place of origin, the consumption-based method allocates the emissions
to the final demand.
The purpose of the study is to depict the consumption-based carbon
and material footprints of a Nordic welfare state, Finland. The focus of
the study is on public spending, which has received little attention in
previous studies. In addition, the study reveals how a welfare state
improves carbon equity between different income groups. This is also
an important and understudied feature of welfare states. Finally, the
paper opens discussion on public policy on green investment based on
the results of the study and previous literature.
Carbon footprints of households have been studied extensively using
household budget surveys that are regularly collected in many coun-
tries (Druckman and Jackson, 2009; Wiedenhofer et al., 2013; Jones
and Kammen, 2014; Heinonen et al., 2013a; 2013b; Nässén et al., 2015;
Ottelin et al., 2015; Ala-Mantila et al., 2016). However, public spending
is usually omitted from these assessments. This gives biased results if
we wish to compare the households living in welfare states to house-
holds living in countries with less public spending. Furthermore, al-
though wide-scoped international carbon and material footprint com-
parisons usually include public spending, they generally lump public
expenditure together with household expenditure and public invest-
ments with private investments (Hertwich and Peters, 2009; Lenzen
et al., 2012; Wiedmann et al., 2015). Wiedmann and Barrett (2011)
have provided a more detailed analysis on the carbon footprint of UK
Central Government. The study at hand gives a similarly detailed
analysis on carbon and material footprints of total public spending in
Finland. In addition, we analyse how the welfare state features affect
carbon equity. While Wiedmann and Barret focus on public procure-
ment policies, we participate in the broader discussion of the re-
lationship between the welfare state and sustainable development.
In welfare states, the reallocation of public funds to services and
individuals are at its core. The welfare state involves a transfer of funds
from the state to the public services provided (i.e., healthcare, educa-
tion, etc.) and direct income transfers to individuals. This is funded
through taxation and usually includes a higher income tax for people
with higher incomes. From an environmental perspective, this has im-
plications on both the quantity and distribution of environmental
pressure within the population (López et al., 2017). In the study, we
examine how this affects the carbon and material footprints of various
income groups and household types.
It should be noted that although the carbon and material footprints
are presented side-by-side in the study, they are very different en-
vironmental indicators. Carbon footprint is an established indicator of
global warming potential with a strong scientific basis. Material foot-
print, however, is more ambiguous. In the study, we use total material
consumption (TMC) as the measure of material footprint. TMC is an
environmental indicator that treats all natural resources similarly, and
expresses them as total mass. It includes direct material input and
hidden flows. Direct material input means natural resources that are
directly used to produce goods and services. Hidden flows are trans-
formed or moved natural resources that are not directly used by an
economy, such as waste rock caused by mining, and materials needed to
produce imported products that are not part of the product’s mass
(Seppälä et al., 2009).
The paper is structured as follows. Next, we present the research
material and methods and then the results. The results section is fol-
lowed by discussion. In the discussion section, we first interpret the
empirical results of the study. Then we provide policy implications and
discuss the broader theme of the welfare state and sustainable devel-
opment. In addition, we discuss the main uncertainties of the study. The
paper ends with conclusions.
2. Research material and methods
2.1. Research material
The main research material of the study is the Statistics Finland’s
Household Budget Survey 2012 and its additional part “Welfare ser-
vices 2012” (Statistics Finland, 2012). In addition, we used the national
accounts for year 2012 (Statistics Finland, 2017a) for filling the re-
maining gaps in public spending.
In the household budget survey that includes the welfare service
addition, the public welfare services are allocated to the households
using these services. The allocation is based on register information,
interviews and administrative unit cost information. For example, the
average unit costs of education are allocated to people who are regis-
tered in schools (high schools, vocational schools, universities etc. se-
parately). The unit costs are vocation and faculty specific, but regional
differences are not taken into account. The costs of basic education are
allocated to all 7- to 15-year-olds according to the compulsory educa-
tion age. Similarly, costs of health care and social services are allocated
to households based on register information about the use of these
services. The used unit costs for health and social services are national
averages.
In the study, we used the national expenditure accounts 2012 that
provide the gross domestic production (GDP) of Finland from the
consumption perspective. The national expenditure accounts are di-
vided into final consumption expenditure and investments, which are
further divided by sector. The sectors include households, government
and non-profit institutions serving households, and in the case of in-
vestments, also corporations. Government stands for both central and
local government. Non-profit institutions include non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) and churches. Investments, officially called gross
fixed capital formation (GFCF), are divided into (1) dwellings, (2) other
buildings and structures, (3) machinery, equipment and vehicles and
(4) other GFCF, largely composed of intellectual property products,
such as research and development (Statistics Finland, 2017a). The
government’s final consumption expenditure is divided into individual
expenditure that serves households directly (Government individual
consumption), and collective expenditure that includes collective
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services, such as public administration, maintenance of infrastructure,
national defence and general safety and security services (Government
collective consumption). Public welfare services belong to the govern-
ment individual consumption.
2.2. Framework for assessing the carbon and material footprints
Table 1 outlines the framework for assessing the carbon and mate-
rial footprints of the welfare state in the study. The framework is based
on the national expenditure accounts 2012. The right-hand side of
Table 1 describes how each of the final demand categories are included
in the carbon and material footprint models of the study. The table
gives the source and type of the expenditure data used in the study and
describes the accuracy of the models. The most detailed data, and thus
the most accurate footprint models, are provided for household ex-
penditure and public welfare services. The accuracy of the data is es-
timated by the authors.
In the study, we chose to use the public welfare service addition of
the household budget survey (Statistics Finland, 2012) to estimate
government individual consumption expenditure instead of using the
national expenditure accounts directly. The main benefit is that in the
household budget survey, the welfare services are allocated to the
households that are actually using the services. However, the downside
is that there is some missing information. The economic value of public
welfare services is ca. €3600 per capita according to the household
budget survey. At the same time, the total value of government in-
dividual consumption expenditure is ca. €6100 per capita according to
the national accounts. The difference is due to several reasons. First, the
government individual consumption also includes some recreational
and cultural services. Second, it also includes institutional care and
social welfare for the disabled and elderly – and the residents of these
institutions are largely missing from the household budget survey.
Third, some health and social service-related information is sensitive,
and thus there is likely to be some loss in the survey. The economic
value of education per capita is almost the same in both data sources,
but there is a discrepancy in health and social services.
To avoid significant underestimation, we assessed the GHG emis-
sions and TMC of the remaining part of the government individual
consumption expenditure by using the national accounts (national
averages). We added this missing part of individual consumption to the
government collective consumption to keep the household-specific data
on public welfare services separated for detailed analyses.
2.3. EE IO analysis and hybrid life-cycle assessment
We assessed the carbon and material footprints of the welfare state
with environmentally extended input-output (EE IO) analysis and
hybrid life-cycle assessment (LCA). In general, EE IO analysis is an es-
tablished method to assess the environmental pressure caused by eco-
nomic activities (Lenzen et al., 2007; Wiedmann, 2009). It is based on
the economic input-output tables of economies. The input-output tables
consist of monetary transaction matrices that are extended with en-
vironmental data in EE IO analysis (Leontief, 1970). The main strength
of the method is the comprehensiveness: the whole economy is included
in the analysis. Another benefit is the simplicity of the method, which
makes it quick to use after the model has been created (Junnila, 2006).
The downside of EE IO analysis is roughness: aggregation error due to
the aggregation of economic sectors and the inherent assumption of
linearity of prices in the model, especially between large public and
smaller private purchases. EE IO models can be made more accurate by
integrating available process LCA data into the model. Such a method is
called hybrid life-cycle assessment, and it aims at combining the best
sides of EE IO analysis and process LCA (Suh et al., 2004). More recent
comparisons of EE IO analysis and process-based methods can be found
in Feng et al. (2011); Schoer et al. (2013); Hubacek and Feng (2016)
and Lutter et al. (2016).
2.4. Carbon and material footprints of the study
In the study, we assessed material footprints with a pure EE IO
model and carbon footprints with a hybrid LCA method. Both footprint
models are based on the EE IO model of the Finnish economy, called
ENVIMAT (Seppälä et al., 2009, 2011). The ENVIMAT model has been
created by the Finnish Environment Institute. The purchaser price table
of ENVIMAT includes 50 commodity categories, and we used it in the
study to assess the carbon and material footprints of individual con-
sumption. Individual consumption includes consumption expenditure
of households and non-profit institutions and the government’s in-
dividual consumption expenditure. The basic price table of ENVIMAT
includes 150 product categories, and we used it to assess the carbon and
material footprints of GFCF and the government’s collective consump-
tion. We used commodity category-specific inflation coefficients to
match the expenditure data from the year 2012 with the ENVIMAT
model from the year 2005. One common problem in single-region EE IO
models is the domestic technology assumption, meaning that imports
are treated as if they were produced with domestic technologies. Multi-
regional (MRIO) models have been created to overcome this problem
(Wiedmann, 2009). ENVIMAT is not a full MRIO model, but imports
have been taken into account by integrating life-cycle inventory (LCI)
data from international databases into the model. This approach sig-
nificantly reduces the uncertainty related to imports (Koskela et al.,
2011). In Seppälä et al. (2011) the original developers of ENVIMAT
report that they used LCI data from Ecoinvent database for the largest
volumes of imported material flows and LCI data from Danish LCA Food
Table 1
Framework for carbon and material footprints of a welfare state (Finland) in the study.
National expenditure accounts (2012) Carbon and material footprint models of the study
Million € Source of expenditure data Type of expenditure data Accuracy of carbon and material footprint models
Final consumption expenditure
Households 104,000 Household budget survey Household specific High
Government individual 32,900 Value of welfare services Household specific Medium
Government collective 15,800 National accounts National average for all Low
Non-profit institutions serving
households
5,400 National accounts National average for all Very low
Gross fixed capital formation
Government 8,100 National accounts National average for all Low
Non-profit institutions serving
households
500 National accounts National average for all Very low
Corporations 23,500 GHG emissions and TMC included inherently in the purchaser price input-output tables
Households 12,500 GHG emissions and TMC of purchase of vehicles and real estate included in the carbon and material footprint models
Total 202,700
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Database for food products. The direct material input of imports they
applied from International Trade Statistics of Finnish Customs.
We describe the hybrid-LCA carbon footprint model of the study in
detail in some of our previous studies on household carbon footprints
(Ottelin et al., 2015; Ala-Mantila et al., 2016). To put it briefly, we used
the hybrid LCA approach by integrating process LCA data on housing
energy and car use into the EE IO model. The ENVIMAT model and thus
the carbon footprint model of the study include CO2, methane, nitrous
oxide and fluorinated GHGs. LUCLUF sector is excluded.
We created the material footprint model for the purpose of the
study. The ENVIMAT model includes the total material requirements
(TMR) of economic activities. TMR consists of direct material inputs
and hidden flows, such as waste rock in mining, logging residuals and
leftover earth in construction. The data for domestic direct and hidden
material flows in ENVIMAT is from Thule Institute’s database on nat-
ural resource use in Finland (Seppälä et al., 2009). The data sources for
the imported material flows are described above. TMR includes do-
mestic consumption and exports. Generally, TMC can be derived from
TMR by subtracting the exports. In the study, we used consumption-
based material intensities provided by Seppälä et al. (2009) to calculate
the TMC of final demand. We built the material footprint model for
households similarly as we built the carbon footprint model by multi-
plying a household’s expenditure by material intensities of products and
services derived from the ENVIMAT model. However, we could not add
the hybrid LCA elements into the material footprint model due to the
lack of suitable process LCA data.
One special feature of both of our footprint models is that we have
compensated the maintenance charges and rents in the household
budget survey by using statistics on the financial statement from the
housing companies provided by Statistics Finland (2017b). This way,
we avoid biases caused by variation in rentals. The statistics give the
average expenses of housing companies per square metre of living
space. The statistics are building type and age specific. Since the
household budget survey includes the same parameters of buildings
(building type, age and living space) for each household, we get a more
accurate estimate of GHG emissions and TMC per household. In the case
of construction, we used a living space-based estimate: 0.7 CO2-eq t/m2
(Säynäjoki et al., 2017) and TMC 6.4 t/m2. We estimated the TMC of
building construction with the ENVIMAT model and total constructed
floor space in Finland in 2005 (base year of the ENVIMAT model).
2.5. Allocation of welfare services and income transfers to households
In order to examine how welfare state features affect the carbon and
material footprints of various income groups and household types, we
first divided the population into six household types. Next, we divided
each of these household types into three income classes so that every
income group (low, middle, high) includes one third of the population.
The income classes are household type specific. Table 2 presents the
average income per capita, average age of the respondent and average
household size of the studied groups. The category of young families
represents families with one or more children under 7 years old.
We used the public welfare service addition of the household budget
survey to allocate the GHG emissions and TMC caused by public welfare
services to the households using these services. In addition, we wanted
to examine how income transfers affect the distribution of environ-
mental impacts between the studied groups. Thus, we calculated the
part of household consumption that is covered with income transfers.
The information on income transfers is provided in the household
budget survey. We subtracted the paid income transfers from the re-
ceived income transfers in order to avoid double counting.
3. Results
3.1. Overview
Public services and investments compose a notable share of the
consumption-based carbon and material footprints in Finland. Fig. 1
illustrates the percentage shares of households, non-profit institutions,
and public services and investments of the total monetary consumption
and consumption-based carbon and material footprints in Finland in
2012. Table 3 displays the monetary consumption and carbon and
material footprints per capita in more detail. In addition, Table 3 pro-
vides the GHG and material intensities for the studied final demand
categories. Total monetary consumption was €33,000 per capita, total
carbon footprint 12.3 CO2-eq t per capita and total material footprint
41 t per capita. The share of government consumption expenditure and
GFCF was 32% (€10,400) of the total monetary consumption, 19% (2.4
CO2-eq t) of the carbon footprint and 38% (16 t) of the material foot-
print. The share of non-profit institutions serving households of total
monetary consumption and environmental burdens was small (3–4%).
3.2. Material footprint
The material footprint (TMC) including public spending was 41 t per
capita in Finland in 2012. For the sake of comparison, the material
footprint without unused extraction of raw materials in Finland was
30 t in 2008 according to Wiedmann et al. (2015). Since Seppälä et al.
(2009) estimate the share of unused extraction (hidden flows) to be
about a quarter of TMC in Finland, the results seem quite comparable.
In the study by Wiedmann et al., the material footprint of Finland was
quite similar to other affluent European countries, except that the share
of fossil fuels was higher – probably due to high use of fossil fuels for
heating.
Construction of buildings and infrastructure play a major role in
composing the material footprint. Household consumption on shelter
(housing energy, maintenance and construction) composes 22%, and
government GFCF 27%, of the total material footprint. The high share
of government GFCF is mainly due to the construction of infrastructure
Table 2
The household type categories and income classes of the study.









low 9,600 23.2 1.3
middle 17,400 25.3 1.4
high 26,200 27.0 1.4
Adults (30-50 years) low 15,800 40.6 1.4
middle 27,100 39.4 1.4
high 41,900 40.6 1.3
Adults (50-65 years) low 16,300 59.9 1.5
middle 25,900 58.4 1.7
high 42,200 58.2 1.5
Seniors (> 65 years) low 14,200 76.3 1.4
middle 19,900 74.1 1.4
high 34,800 72.3 1.5
Young families &
single parents
low 9,400 37.8 3.9
middle 15,300 38.5 3.4
high 23,300 41.5 3.1
Other families with
children
low 12,700 47.2 4.5
middle 18,600 47.1 3.6
high 29,600 50.5 3.5
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and related earth moving, which are responsible for approximately 80%
of the TMC of government GFCF.
As explained in the introduction, TMC is an environmental indicator
that treats all resources as equal and sums them up as total mass. Thus,
it says very little about resource depletion, for example (Fang and
Heijungs, 2014). However, the massive material footprint of the gov-
ernment GFCF particularly due to earth moving does indicate that the
public sector is responsible for large land-use changes because of
greenfield construction. The annual construction of infrastructure ac-
tually has a higher TMC than the annual construction of residential
buildings in Finland. Thus, infrastructure should not be neglected when
the environmental impacts of construction are assessed. The land-use
changes due to the construction of infrastructure may have significant
GHG implications as well. For example, forests are cut in order to build
transport and energy networks. These impacts are generally excluded
from carbon footprint assessments.
3.3. Welfare services and carbon equity
The carbon footprints of Finnish households have been studied
extensively (Heinonen et al., 2011, 2013a, 2013b; Ala-Mantila et al.,
2014, 2016; Ottelin et al., 2015, 2017, 2018). Thus, we focus here on
the new findings of the study. As already noted in the overview above
the share of public spending was 19% (2.4 CO2-eq t) of the total carbon
footprint. Here, we focus on a more gradual analysis of public welfare
services, since the data allows us to examine them in more detail than
other public expenditure. While government GFCF and collective con-
sumption are difficult to allocate to specific households in any other
way except equal shares, public welfare services can be allocated to the
households actually using these services. Fig. 2 depicts how the addi-
tion of public welfare services affects the carbon footprints of different
income groups and household types. In addition, in order to highlight
how welfare states improve the carbon equity between different income
groups, the part of household consumption that is covered with income
transfers has been shaded with darker grey in the figure. The same
figures for material footprints are presented in the Appendix A (Figs. A1
and A2). The material footprints follow the same pattern.
Table 4 presents how large share of carbon footprint is caused by the
public welfare services and income transfers in different income
quantiles. On average, the consumption covered by income transfers
Fig. 1. Monetary consumption and consumption-based carbon and material footprints of Finland in 2012: Shares of public spending.
*Collective consumption includes here the residue of public individual consumption that is not welfare services, see method section.
Table 3
Final demand, carbon and material footprints and GHG and material intensities.
€ per capita CO2-eq t per capita TMC t per capita CO2-eq kg/€ TMC kg/€
Public welfare services Education 1,650 0.40 0.72 0.24 0.44
Health 1,560 0.31 1.06 0.20 0.68
Social services 390 0.06 0.12 0.15 0.31
Total public welfare services 3600 0.76 1.89 0.21 0.53
Collective consumption* Collective consumption 3,110 0.64 1.68 0.21 0.54
Added individual consumption 2,300 0.34 0.84 0.15 0.37
Total collective consumption 5,410 0.98 2.52 0.18 0.47
Government GFCF Buildings and infrastructure 780 0.38 10.51 0.49 13.47
Machinery and equipment 160 0.20 0.47 1.25 2.94
Other GFCF 470 0.10 0.27 0.21 0.57
Total government GFCF 1,410 0.67 11.25 0.48 7.98
Non-profit institutions Consumption expenditure 1,000 0.43 1.02 0.43 1.02
GFCF 90 0.03 0.32 0.33 3.56
Total non-profit institutions 1,090 0.46 1.35 0.42 1.23
Households Shelter 4,950 3.20 9.04 0.65 1.83
Private vehicles 2,500 1.84 2.14 0.74 0.86
Other travel 940 0.70 1.00 0.74 1.06
Services 2,670 0.64 2.05 0.24 0.77
Tangibles 3,090 1.38 4.18 0.45 1.35
Food 2,600 1.67 5.77 0.64 2.22
Total households 21,470 9.43 24.19 0.44 1.13
Total all 32,980 12.31 41.20 0.37 1.25
*Collective consumption includes here the residue of public individual consumption that is not welfare services, see method section.
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compose 12% and public welfare services 6% of total carbon footprint.
Taxation is progressive in Finland, which allows the relatively high
average share of income transfers. In the highest income quantile, the
share of income transfers is negative because the group pays more in-
come transfers than it receives.
Fig. 2 and Table 4 demonstrate the general pattern that carbon
footprints increase with increasing income. However, welfare states
improve carbon equity with two mechanisms: (1) the use of public
welfare services tends to increase with decreasing income and (2) a
significant share of household consumption is covered with income
transfers in lower income groups and among pensioners. In countries
with less welfare state features, the difference between various income
groups is much harsher. For example Shammin and Bullard (2009)
demonstrate that in US the highest income quantile has around four
times as high carbon footprint as the lowest income quantile. Similarly,
Wiedenhofer et al. (2017) reveal even larger differences in carbon
footprints between urban rich and rural poor residents in China. Fig. 3
illustrates in more detail, which welfare services various households
use, and how public welfare services are supplemented or substituted
with private welfare services. The use of private welfare services is
derived from the household budget survey. Recreational and cultural
services are subsidised by the government, although mainly paid di-
rectly by households.
As Fig. 3 illustrates, the use of private services tends to increase with
income, while the use of public welfare services generally decreases
with income. Most strikingly, the use of public education services de-
creases with increasing income among young adults and families. This
is quite natural, since students have lower income than those young
adults who have already graduated and moved onto working life. In-
come correlates with age here (see Table 2). Education is pre-
dominantly a free-of-charge public service in Finland. In the case of
families, also the number of children and children’s age may affect the
result. In other words, it may be that in lower-income families the
Fig. 2. The impact of public welfare services and income transfers on the household carbon footprints.
Table 4
The share of income transfers and public welfare services of total carbon
footprint by income quantiles.
Income group Income transfers Public welfare services Total CF (CO2-eq t)
Lowest 25% 28 % 10 % 9.5
Mid 50% 12 % 6 % 12.4
Highest 25% −21 % 2 % 18.5
Fig. 3. The carbon footprint of public and private welfare services by household type and income group.
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parents are more often still students, but it also seems that they have
more school-aged children (see Table 2). Income per capita decreases
with increasing household size (see Table 2). Private education plays
only a minor role in Finland. Public health services are used quite
equally in all income groups. When household types are compared,
seniors use them most. The peak among low-income adults (30–50
years) suggests that health problems at a young age are likely to cause
income losses, and/or that poverty increases health risks. Private health
services are most popular among middle- and high-income seniors, but
all groups use them to some extent. Social services are mainly childcare
and domestic services for the elderly, which explains the high use
among young families and seniors. Private childcare increases in po-
pularity with increasing income. The use of recreational and cultural
services increases with income but all groups use them at least to some
extent.
4. Discussion
4.1. Discussion on the results of the study
The aim of the study was to examine how the addition of public
spending affects the carbon footprints of welfare state citizens.
Although the carbon footprints of households have been studied ex-
tensively, the studies are usually based on household budget surveys. As
a general rule, these studies exclude public spending. At the same time,
international carbon and material footprint comparisons often include
public spending (Hertwich and Peters, 2009; Lenzen et al., 2012;
Giljum et al., 2015; Wiedmann et al., 2015) but only at a very rough
level, the focus being elsewhere.
The results of the study reveal that the contribution of public
spending on total carbon and material footprints per capita is not
negligible. Thus, studies on household carbon and material footprints in
welfare states generally underestimate the environmental burdens
caused by the citizens of these countries, compared to studies from
countries with less public spending. This should be taken into account
when comparing and applying the results of such studies, for example
the recent studies by Ivanova et al. (2016, 2017).
Furthermore, the results demonstrate that while the addition of
welfare services to household carbon footprints increases the carbon
equity between various income groups, it does not change the general
pattern that environmental burdens increase with increasing income.
However, the joint effect of public welfare services and income trans-
fers on carbon equity is tremendous, compared to countries without
these welfare state features. For example, in US the highest income
quantile has around four times as high carbon footprint as the lowest
income quantile (Shammin and Bullard, 2009) and in China the dif-
ference between urban rich and rural poor is even harsher
(Wiedenhofer et al., 2017). Hubacek et al. (2017) highlighted similar
carbon inequalities globally. We found that in Finland the carbon
footprint of the highest income quantile is less than double the carbon
footprint of the lowest income quantile. From the perspective of en-
vironmental policy, welfare states can influence strongly the environ-
mental impacts of public services and investments. These are directly
organised or purchased by public organisations. For example in the EU,
green public procurement policies are already in place (European
Commission, 2008). The income transfers, on the other hand, are paid
to the consumers, and the consumers can usually decide themselves
what goods and services they purchase. These environmental impacts
are more difficult to target.
4.2. Why and how governments should enhance green investments
The broader theme of the study is the relationship between the
welfare state and sustainable development. We find it important to
depict the total composition of consumption-based carbon and material
footprints of a welfare state, since, in order to reduce the environmental
burdens of the society, we need a comprehensive understanding of
which economic activities drive the emissions and material require-
ments. The consumption-based accounting method, used in the study,
lays bare the environmental pressure caused by our high living stan-
dards. Indirectly, it also captures the relationships between investments
and public and private consumption. The following policy suggestions
draw from previous literature and not only from the results of the study.
In addition, they take into account the traditional role of the welfare
state that is to guarantee the economic stability, jobs and welfare for its
citizens.
One of the special features of consumption-based GHG assessment is
that it captures the rebound effects of consumption. In general, rebound
effect means the unintended consequences of climate change mitigation
measures due to shifts in consumption (Lenzen and Dey, 2002;
Hertwich, 2005; Druckman et al., 2011). Usually, rebound effects are
considered as unwanted side effects. However, some studies have found
evidence of desirable rebound effects (additional GHG reductions) re-
lated to investments (Mizobuchi, 2008; Nässén and Holmberg, 2009;
Chitnis et al., 2013; Font Vivanco et al., 2014; Ottelin, 2016; Ottelin
et al., 2017, 2018). In practice, the invested funds must be withdrawn
from other purposes that would otherwise cause emissions. Nässén and
Holmberg (2009) theorised the phenomenon and suggested that en-
vironmentally driven early adoption of new (costly) technologies might
be a good strategy. Jackson (2011) suggested that ecological invest-
ments could be used at macro-economic level to achieve sustainability.
GDP, which despite its deficiencies, is one of the main welfare in-
dicators that decision makers in welfare states follow, is actually in-
different about the nature of the economic activities it measures
(Jackson, 2011). Thus, we could shift a part of economic activity from
consumption to investments, without endangering the stability of
economy. Investments into developing and introducing new clean
technologies seem the most reliable way to achieve absolute decou-
pling, required to have economic growth without increasing environ-
mental burdens. Statistics of the World Bank reveal that the share of
investments of GDP has declined in the EU region (EU28) from around
30% in 1970 to 20% in 2015 (World Bank, 2017). The trend has been
similar in many welfare states: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany,
Italy, Netherlands, UK, and to some extent France and Sweden. Thus,
we seem to have room to increase the share of investments again. What
makes this approach problematic at the time being is that green in-
vestments are unlikely to be as profitable as traditional investments. As
Jackson (2011) put it, ecological investments have different rates and
periods of return from what we have learned to expect. Similarly, lit-
erature on environmental innovation has found that returns of investing
in environmental innovation are very uncertain (Borghesi et al., 2015).
The root of the problem is that the external environmental costs of
economic activities are left for the society instead of demanding the
companies and ultimately the consumers to pay them.
Green investments could be enhanced by introducing stronger en-
vironmental economic policies, such as carbon pricing. If GHG emis-
sions had a higher price, it would increase the profitability of low-
carbon and negative emission technologies (e.g. carbon capture and
storage), which would speed up their development. Interestingly, re-
search on the impact of government policy on environmental and clean
innovations in the private sector has led to similar conclusions
(Veugelers, 2012; Borghesi et al., 2015). Veugelers (2012) highlights
that carbon pricing does not only reduce the consumption of dirty
technologies, but is also an important incentive for the private sector to
develop and adopt clean technologies. Another issue is that environ-
mental innovations tend to benefit the general public instead of the
investor (e.g. investing firm). According to Borghesi et al. (2015), this is
one of the main reasons why firms generally have little or no incentive
to perform environmental innovations unless environmental regulation
induces them to do so.
A report by the World Bank (Kossoy et al., 2015) reveals that al-
though there is an increasing amount of carbon pricing policies around
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the world, there is a high degree of variation in the price of carbon, and
generally, the price is often too low to create a strong incentive for the
private sector. Some firms have actually adopted internal carbon pri-
cing as a strategic tool in order to gain a competitive edge in the low-
carbon markets. Similarly, one could imagine that a country or a region
with strong carbon pricing policies would be in the forefront in devel-
oping technologies that everybody will need eventually. Welfare states
have one asset on this score: an existing large public sector and the
taxes needed for its funding. What needs to be done in order to shift to
an environmentally sustainable economy and speed up environmental
innovation, is to shift the taxation away from services and goods – and
labour – that have low GHG intensity to goods and services with high
GHG intensity. This could be done without increasing the taxation
overall. Although there is undoubtedly a lot of opposition from GHG-
intensive economic sectors, there would also be a lot of winners in such
a shift, including many service sectors, service-based economy in gen-
eral, clean technology companies, design, research and development
etc. (see Table 3). In general, we could describe such economy as
striving for better with less.
Carbon pricing policies have one serious fault, however: they tend
to affect the lowest income groups most, since basic goods, such as
energy and food have a high GHG intensity (Druckman and Jackson,
2008; Shammin and Bullard, 2009; Wiedenhofer et al., 2013). Thus,
new income transfer policies would be needed as well. In practice, this
means that the price of energy and food would increase for all, but the
low-income households could cover the increasing costs with the new
income transfers. Thus, their carbon footprints would not necessarily
decrease. The main GHG reductions would come from the changes in
the consumption behaviour of middle- and high-income households.
For example, flying would become less affordable for many, but at the
same time, the price of low-carbon services, including ICT services and
many recreational and welfare services, would decrease. Middle- and
high-income households would have to reduce or restructure their
consumption. Either way, the GHG emissions would decrease and
carbon equity between various income classes increase.
While higher carbon taxes (or increasing carbon price in general)
would redirect consumption to low-carbon services and goods, to en-
hance negative emission technologies (NETs), somebody would have to
pay for taking carbon out from the atmosphere. Intuitively, this seems
like a state’s role. Part of the returns of carbon taxes could be used to
support NET investments in the private sector, and directly to NET
investments in the public sector. Otherwise, we may be locked in a
situation where NETs are more expensive and even more carbon in-
tensive in the construction or implementation phase than their com-
peting technologies, even though during their whole lifecycle they
would be superior.
4.3. Main limitations and uncertainties of the study
The main strength of the consumption-based accounting, used in the
study, is its comprehensiveness. It includes all life-cycle GHG emissions
and TMC, without double counting at any stage. However, the model is
highly aggregated, and the assumptions of linearity and homogeneity of
prices cause uncertainty. In addition, in the study, we used the value of
welfare services for the household, instead of national accounts di-
rectly, to assess the carbon and material footprints of government in-
dividual consumption, which causes some inconsistency. Nonetheless,
the chosen approach allowed us to analyse the use of these public
services in more detail at household level.
Material footprints are less studied than carbon footprints, probably
because of the weaker scientific basis. Material footprint, TMC in the
study, treats all resources as equal and sums them up as total mass. This
sort of approach has been criticised for not taking into account that the
environmental impacts can be highly material specific (Steinberger
et al., 2010; Fang and Heijungs, 2014; Steinmann et al., 2017). For
example, Fang and Heijungs (2014) point out that such an indicator
fails to address the scarcity of resources. They propose a resource de-
pletion footprint instead, which would treat materials differently de-
pending on their scarcity. We agree with these notions, but in the study,
we had no possibility to use a more sophisticated indicator due to lack
of appropriate data. The material footprint is still included in the study,
because it gives some interesting insights into the environmental
pressure of public spending, particularly public investments. In addi-
tion, material productivity is an important sustainability indicator at
the EU and OECD. However, the results should be interpreted carefully,
since the indicator has the obvious weakness described above.
5. Conclusions
The purpose of the study was to depict the consumption-based
carbon and material footprints of a welfare state by focusing on public
spending that has been neglected in previous literature. The aim was
also to reveal, how welfare state features, such as public welfare ser-
vices and income transfers, affect carbon equity. The broader theme of
the study was the relationship between the welfare state and sustain-
able development, which is reflected in the policy implications of the
study.
The main findings of the study are that the share of public spending
of carbon and material footprints is not negligible, and welfare states
significantly improve carbon equity between households. In the study,
public spending composes 19% of the carbon footprint and 38% of the
material footprint of welfare state citizens. Welfare states enhance
carbon equity with two mechanisms: (1) the use of public welfare
services tends to increase with decreasing income and (2) a significant
share of consumption is covered with income transfers in lower income
groups. The joint effect is tremendous compared to countries with less
welfare state features.
The policy implications of the study take into account the tradi-
tional role of the welfare state that is to guarantee the economic and
social wellbeing of its citizens. However, in order to achieve sustainable
development, environmental burdens need to be decoupled from eco-
nomic growth. Based on previous literature on consumption-based GHG
emissions, green investments seem the most viable way to achieve ab-
solute decoupling. Investments in new (costly) clean technologies do
not only reduce the targeted emissions, but in addition, cause desirable
rebound effects since they reduce the budget of other investments and
consumption, and related GHG emissions (Mizobuchi, 2008; Nässén
and Holmberg, 2009; Chitnis et al., 2013; Font Vivanco et al., 2014;
Ottelin, 2016; Ottelin et al., 2017, 2018). However, in the current
economic model the best clean technologies for the environment are
not always profitable in economic terms. Thus, we need stronger en-
vironmental economic policies, such as carbon pricing, to enhance the
development and implementation of clean technologies. Welfare states
have one asset on this score: an existing large public sector and the
taxes needed for its funding. Shifting the emphasis of the taxation on
GHG intensive economic activities would drive the technology to the
right direction. Without these drivers, low-carbon and carbon negative
technologies are too expensive too long, and we have a limited time-
frame to mitigate climate change.
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